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The paper presented is a commentary on Prof. Vlad P. 
Glăveanu's paper published in the previous volume of the 
journal. In reaction to his inspiring and valuable text, while 
confirming the vast majority of his detailed observations, 
I have articulated a different opinion about its main conclu-
sion: the presence of a crisis in the domain of the psycholo-
gy of creativity. In my opinion such a crisis does not exist. 
On the contrary: intense, though rather unsystematic, devel-
opment may be observed within the discipline. This stand-
point is explained in detail in my commentary. 
IS IT WORTH WAITING FOR THE MESSIAH? 
In 2003, in a digressive footnote to my doctoral thesis (published six years later), I some-
what viciously expressed my personal opinion: “in comparison with other fields of the hu-
manities and even with social sciences, the philosophy of psychology (i.e., its metames-
sage, or fundamental assumptions) is marked by unusually strong conservatism. In the 
absence of discussions over the principals (due to lack of interest), conservatism mani-
fests itself implicitly — in scientific practice (Chruszczewski, 2009, p. 111). In other words, 
instead of babbling, one should do research. Of course the way to do research is com-
monly known, i.e., experimentalism, inductive statistics. Theorizing should be — as far as 
possible — avoided, at least until one gets old; however even then it is safer to content 
oneself with criticizing younger colleagues (preferably in anonymous reviews). I am all the 
more grateful to Prof. Glăveanu for his invigorating article (Glăveanu, 2014) because 
even though discussions on essential issues, including the way of doing science (contrary 
to the verbatim understanding of what I have written above), have taken place in the his-
tory of psychology, they have always been far too scarce. I would also like to mention 
here, on the one hand, the opinions of Ambrose (1996) and Karwowski (2012) which con-
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verge with many of Glăveanu’s theses, and on the other hand, the text of Baer (2011), 
which is highly critical of metanarrative nostalgia. They both provide a very interesting 
theoretical context for the following comments on Glăveanu’s article. 
I will restrain myself from repeating here all the detailed arguments made by the au-
thor, with whom by the way, I am often inclined to agree. I will only mention, among other 
things, the great quantitative increase in research on the psychology of creativity coun-
tered, at the same time, by a strong deficit in valuable synthesis and new theories, and 
the phenomenon of focusing research on and through research techniques, which in-
cludes the emphasis on improvement of measurement methods, rather than on problems. 
This has been true for a long time now, for already Hudson (1967) wrote about the risk of 
statistical and test reductionism in psychology, and yet “the world has moved forward” 
since his times. Nevertheless, some concepts in the psychology of creativity, including 
those stemming from multivariate analysis, are still quite sophisticated, whilst, for exam-
ple, in the psychology of personality, the factorial approach has reached its Olympus 
of reductionism in the form of one general factor of personality (Musek, 2007). At this 
point, the question comes to mind: is only the psychology of creativity in crisis? I will re-
turn to this problem later. 
Glăveanu’s remark that the study of creativity, as indeed other types of research 
as well, does not take place in a socio-political vacuum, but on the contrary, is part and 
parcel of a certain ideology, is in my view rare, precious and original. The individualistic 
orientation on competing entities who contribute to the production of values of which the 
final goal is to increase both consumption and socioeconomic hiatus, which he consid-
ers dominant in theories and research on creativity (while dealt with critically from a left-
wing standpoint), is also worthy of appreciation and wider discussion. The fact that soci-
ology, for example, has had no problem in recognizing the political context of ways 
of practicing scientific discourse, while psychology has an almost clinical problem with 
it, is also astonishing. 
There is also a need, as Glăveanu points out, for critical reflection upon the definitions 
that determine the directions of research and types of questions posed, while other ques-
tions are left unspoken. At the same time he writes — in the spirit of Lyotard (1979/1984), 
or even Sartre (1943/1972), if not Hegel himself (1807/1977) — that every act of analysis 
is a kind of violence against reality. How rare an observation among representatives 
of the empirical sciences! 
But can modern methodology provide a conclusive study of such systematic, dynamic, 
contextually entangled and time-varying relations as the phenomenon of creativity, as in 
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my opinion Glăveanu understands it? I am afraid that such methods are (so far?) nonex-
istent, or else they are not known to most researchers (including me). An interesting har-
binger of methodological progress which might also be employed within the realm of the 
psychology of creativity is perhaps the apparatus of dynamical social psychology, though 
unfortunately somewhat complicated (Nowak & Vallacher, 1998). 
If we do not stand up to the challenge, we may face an all too familiar postmodern im-
passe: not wanting to give priority to any point of view at the expense of another and 
avoiding cognitive violence of the whole at the expense of its parts, we may mistake total-
ism for totalitarianism and due to the fear of falling into an unlawful dictatorship of thought 
we will not be able to say anything categorically about anything, or merely describing ten-
tative, transient, kaleidoscopic configurations of phenomena while disregarding any kind 
of classification. In the case of science which aspires to intersubjectivity this leads, how-
ever, to aporia and epistemic failure, unless we are ready to trust the popular, contempo-
rary, feminist philosopher Butler (1990, p. 15) who writes that “without the presupposition 
or goal of “unity”, which is, in either case, always instituted at a conceptual level, provi-
sional unities might emerge in the context of concrete actions that have purposes other 
than the articulation of identity.” However, it is unlikely that psychologists representing 
a rather essentialist orientation would voluntarily agree to such a thing. Nevertheless, 
such processes can occur without their conscious consent. 
It is a peculiar paradox that Glăveanu, aware of restrictions inherent in the cognitive 
apparatus of contemporary psychology of creativity, deconstructs this apparatus, while 
complaining about the dispersion of results and the lack of great theoretical syntheses. 
It is either-or. For a long time we have been departing from scientific theories (and in the 
domain of culture from world-views) that are general, comprehensive and aspiring, how-
ever not always explicitly, to the rank of absolute truth in favour of theories that are local, 
particular, specific and relative. This can be observed in psychology, including the psy-
chology of creativity, e.g., in the discussion on its generality or specificity (i.e., Baer, 
1998). Such divergence, which maximizes the variety of results, contexts and perspec-
tives, could be potentially creative, if there were to be a reconfiguration of components 
together with their (in a way convergent) synthesis. 
Should we yearn for the return of great, or at least big metanarratives? Prof. Glăveanu 
recalls some great names from the past. However, the issue is that earlier in the history of 
psychology, theories of larger calibre were sometimes shaped by the rhetorical talents of 
their authors, and their often imposing general knowledge, the courage to express per-
sonal beliefs and their extreme insensitivity to criticism, rather than by arguments which 
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proceed from observation and research carried out by them. Freud, Jung and Laing are 
examples of this. Today the situation is different. And let us also not forget that the veraci-
ty of numerous elements of these early theories was negated on the basis of more objec-
tive reasons. Of course I am well aware that creative and innovative concepts do not 
have to be entirely correct or agreeable with all available data. A creator does not have to 
be the grandmaster of accuracy. Opening a new perspective is oftentimes more important 
than a carefully written prescription. Unfortunately, it seems to me that in today’s era, 
dominated by the worship of scrupulous, efficient and — as far as possible — continuous 
scientific productivity, which should additionally be accepted in the review system adopt-
ed by journals, revolutionary ideas are far more difficult to postulate (cf. Charlton, 2009). 
Thus, there are no great theorists in our field or else they are not heard, or otherwise 
deemed untrustworthy. 
Maybe we should return to Butler’s remark and hope that a certain level of deregula-
tion of the system (here: the psychology of creativity) and overburdening it with test re-
sults will lead back to spontaneous, parallel and bottom-up reorganizations which will be 
like new bubbles in a broth that has been bubbling for some time. Forasmuch waiting for 
a new grand theorist may be, I am afraid, like waiting for the messiah. 
IS IT REALLY THAT BAD? 
Despite its limitations, the psychology of creativity has been booming since Guilford. So is 
it actually that bad? It is always easier to diagnose a critical state of something, if we first 
determine what the ambitious criteria of ‘normal’ are. Does such an intention not echo in 
the text under discussion? Glăveanu’s ideas are, after all, convincing, his claims to reality 
are usually accurate and the outlined aspirations — extremely ambitious (although they 
are heuristically and thus quite generally, delineated). If we want to bring his theoretical 
thinking to the extreme (even if it is a logical extreme) we might say that the day when we 
reach a good theory of creativity par excellence, will be the day on which we learn what 
specific conditions are required to create a philosophical treatise, lead a political group to 
victory or write a drama. In my opinion such a day will never come. 
Therefore, I would like to oppose the impression that might impose itself after reading 
Glăveanu’s very interesting article that the psychology of creativity — perhaps in compari-
son with other fields of psychology — is in some special way deficient, stuck in a particu-
lar crisis, and, while creating nothing new, merely administers outdated concepts by sub-
stituting conceptual thinking with methodological impetus. In my view, the psychology of 
creativity is not in a different position from the rest of psychology, and perhaps some of 
the other socio-humanistic fields as well, although I lack sufficient orientation to make this 
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claim with full conviction. And if we were to focus on the psychology of intelligence or per-
sonality, would we not see similar symptoms of crisis? And is it inevitably a crisis? 
One can criticize methods of questionnaire and test diagnoses for their peculiar artifici-
ality. Cannot experimental situations be artificial as well? Tests of divergent production 
can represent the totality of the creative process only to a very limited extent. But cannot 
the same be said about IQ tests in relation to the processes of thinking and solving prob-
lems? And yet IQ tests are, within their own limits, accurate and reliable (indeed more so 
than “creativity tests”), and their employment in research—due to the objectification of 
mental assessments — has yielded very good results. Is knowledge of the genetic basis 
of human behaviour not scattered? Or was there recently a breakthrough in developmen-
tal psychology thanks to some new Vygotsky? Or rather, as I inclined to think, do we still 
have theoretical polyphony and a huge variety of research? Such questions are endless. 
We can also ask a different question: are these signs of exhaustion, or maybe of unsys-
tematic development? 
Conclusion: there is not a greater crisis in the psychology of creativity than in other ar-
eas of psychology; what is more, I am not sure whether psychology (including the psy-
chology of creativity) is in crisis at all, although — when reading Glăveanu — I believe it 
is! However, some time after reading his article, I think that this “crisis” is an inevitable 
stage of development which follows understandable boredom caused by the exploitation 
of common research directions, easy acceptance of existing definitional and conceptual 
systems and finally of the hypertrophy of data analyzed by routine methods. However, if 
the “crisis” is to be “overcome” it will happen “bottom-up” rather than “top-down”. The real 
hope lies neither in a theorist-messiah nor genius-creator, but in the primordial broth — 
bubbling with the promise of startling reconfigurations — which we all co-create. 
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